



I. SUMMARY

Discrediting Ukraine's leadership in the eyes of both Ukrainians and the international community is one of Moscow's primary objectives. Information operations conducted by Russian intelligence agencies with this aim target not only government officials, parliamentarians, and the President but also the First Lady of Ukraine, Olena Zelenska.

The campaign to discredit Olena Zelenska was launched in the early days of the full-scale invasion and continues to this day. The main themes of the information operations against Olena Zelenska are corruption, crimes against children, and the misuse of international aid, which align with the broader metanarratives of Russian propaganda identified previously by the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security through its narrative analysis.

As indicated by narrative analysis and monitoring data obtained through the artificial intelligence platform Osavul, which evaluates information and narrative impact, most information operations targeting Olena Zelenska follow a typical pattern. Typically, a fabricated story is introduced into the information space through foreign sources (or sources posing as foreign), then synchronously distributed through Russian propaganda networks, reaching both Ukrainian and global audiences. The primary entry point for Russian propaganda targeting Ukrainian audiences is the messaging app Telegram.

Overall, the information operations against Olena Zelenska are part of a comprehensive effort by Russian intelligence agencies to discredit Ukraine in the eyes of the West, notably as part of the **Doppelganger** operation. These efforts also aim to create divisions within Western societies and increase tensions within Ukraine. The informational attacks on the First Lady of Ukraine form a component of Russia's broader information warfare, necessitating appropriate responses and countermeasures.



II. KEY PROPAGANDA NARRATIVES

The attacks targeting Olena Zelenska are, in essence, variations of the broader metanarratives of Russian propaganda, which are analyzed by the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security.

GENERAL METANARRATIVE

"There is rampant corruption in Ukraine"

"Ukraine commits crimes against children"

«Ukraine is stealing international aid»

THEMATIC INVARIANCE

"Olena Zelenska luxuriates while the people suffer, and Ukraine begs for help"

> «Olena Zelenska is involved in Ukraine's crimes against children»

> > «Olena Zelenska is involved in fraud with foreign humanitarian aid»

Russian propaganda most aggressively employs themes of corruption and crimes against children in its information operations. This choice can be explained by two factors.

First, such severe accusations are likely to provoke the strongest negative reactions from the target audience.

Second, Russian intelligence agencies consider the specific activities of Ukraine's First Lady.

Since the beginning of the full-scale war, the Olena Zelenska Foundation has actively supported children, and Olena Zelenska herself has been advocating for aid to Ukraine on the international stage.



III. KEY INFORMATION OPERATIONS

1. METANARRATIVE «THERE IS RAMPANT CORRUPTION IN UKRAINE»

Through narrative analysis based on prior work by the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security, along with monitoring of the information space using the AI-based platform Osavul for assessing information and narrative impact, we identified the key Russian information operations aimed at discrediting Olena Zelenska from March 2022 to August 2024. The study reveals that the primary target audiences for these operations were citizens of foreign countries. However, we also identified a mechanism for disseminating disinformation to the Ukrainian audience, as well as the main entry points used by Russian intelligence to penetrate Ukraine's information space.

"ZELENSKYI'S MOTHER-IN-LAW OWNS APARTMENTS IN MOSCOW"

CONTENT OF THE DISINFORMATION ATTACK. In March 2022, Russian propaganda indirectly targeted Olena Zelenska by publishing a series of "exposé" articles

claiming that her mother, Olha Kiyashko, allegedly owned two apartments in Moscow. In reality, propagandists had falsely labeled a Russian woman with the same last name as "Zelensky's mother-in-law."

SOURCE OF THE DISINFORMATION ATTACK.

The disinformation was likely spread on March 9, 2022, through the Telegram channel ZER-GULIO, run by the "blogger" Serhiy Kolyasnikov. Kolyasnikov disseminates Russian propaganda narratives on various online platforms (Live-Journal, YouTube) and has also collaborated with the Russian state news agency «RIA Novosti.» The fake story was immediately spread by several pro-Russian media outlets, such as "Tsargrad," as well as a network of pro-Russian Telegram channels.


SPREADING CHANNELS. According to monitoring data, between March 9, 2022, and March 23, 2022, the disinformation was spread by 44 sources, 19 of which were identified as state-affiliated (Russian Federation), and 17 were identified as distributed as distribute

раионе Тушино, другая на Варшавском шоссе. И то и другое жилье бизнес-класса. Первая записана на тещу Зеленского – Кияшко Ольгу Витальевну. Вторая – на его жену Зеленскую Елену Владимировну. И если теща стала собственником еще в 2007 году, то жена, судя по выписке из ЕГРН, оформила собственность в январе 2019-го, то есть уже после всем известных событий в Крыму и Донбассе и за 4 месяца до того, как ее муж стал президентом. По закону Зеленский должен был задекларировать эту недвижимость, однако не сделал это ни во время президентской кампании, ни после. Сейчас обе квартиры сдаются в аренду, как сдается и другая недвижимость семьи Зеленских - 130 метровый пентхаус в Крыму, 15-ти комнатная вилла в Италии и 10 гостиничных номеров в Грузии. Известно, что кроме этого у Зеленского есть дом 353 метра, 4 квартиры в Киеве общей площадью более

Screenshot from telegram-channel ZERGULIO

tified as distributors of disinformation. Of these, 24 had previously been involved in other information operations, according to data from the Osavul platform.





The primary source of spreading the fake story were Russian Telegram channels (including those mimicking Ukrainian ones), targeting both Russian and Ukrainian (including temporarily occupied territories) audiences.

 Джерела
 3міст

Джерела Зміст					
Усього джерел: 5					
Джерело	Аудиторія	Країна походження	Афілійованість	Афілійована країна	Доказ афілійова
■ Шейх Тамир https://t.me/sheyhtamlr1974	447k	Ukraine			
Украина.ру https://t.me/ukraina_ru	440k	Ukraine	Пов'язане з державою	Russia	rusnya.cc
ПриZрак Новороссии https://t.me/ghost_of_novor	192k	Ukraine	Пов'язане з державою	Russia	Detector Media
✓ Лохматый Z Николаев, Сергей https://t.me/L0HMATIY	33.1k	Ukraine	Пов'язане з державою	Russia	Detector Media
Виталий Баковец - Полесский https://t.me/pripyatpartizan	2.91k	Ukraine			


This fake story was reintroduced in November 2022. The source of the re-injection was Telegram channels (like «Pervy Kharkovskyi» «Ukropsky Fresh» and «Otryad Kovpaka» etc.) which are part of a network of Russian propaganda Telegram channels.



"THE ZELENSKY FAMILY BOUGHT A \$5 MILLION VILLA IN EGYPT"


CONTENT OF THE DISINFORMATION ATTACK. In late August to September 2023, Russian propaganda spread a fake story claiming that the Zelensky family had purchased a \$5 million villa in the Egyptian city of El Gouna, near the estate of actress Angelina Jolie.

SOURCE OF THE DISINFORMATION ATTACK. The disinformation was spread through the Nigerian online publication **PUNCH**, allegedly on behalf of so-called



Egyptian investigative journalist, Mohamed Al-Alawi. According to the fake "documents" published, Olena Zelenska's mother, Olha Kiyashko, was supposedly the owner of the property.

SPREADING CHANNELS. In the Russian-speaking segment of the internet, the disinformation was spread by 49 sources between August 27-29, with 13 identified as state-affiliated (Russian Federation) and 13 as distributors of disinformation. According to data from the Osavul platform, 30 of these sources had been involved in other information operations previously.



The fake story was most widely spread to the Ukrainian audience through the Telegram messenger app, via channels mimicking Ukrainian ones, but which are actually part of a network of propaganda Telegram channels created by Russia.

Джерело	Аудиторія	Країна походження	Афілійованість	Афілійована країна	Доказ афілійованості
Чёрный Квартал https://t.me/chernly_kvartal	29.6k	Ukraine	Пов'язане з державою	Russia	rusnya.cc
▼ Украина новости https://t.me/ukrainetopnews	24k	Ukraine			
Одесса Za Победу! ↑ https://t.me/OdessaRussi	17.4k	Ukraine	Пов'язане з державою	Russia	Detector Media
PoliTube_news https://t.me/PoliTube_news	15.2k	Ukraine			
▼ Харьков Z Вещает https://t.me/KharkovZV	7.73k	Ukraine	Пов'язане з державою	Russia	Detector Media
 Харьковчаночка Za Правду https://t.me/kharkovchanoch 	4.07k	Ukraine			
✓ Лента	3.21k	Ukraine			




"ZELENSKA SPENT \$1.1 MILLION ON CARTIER JEWELRY"

CONTENT OF THE DISINFORMATION ATTACK. In early October 2023, Russian propaganda spread a fake story claiming that Olena Zelenska, during her official visit to the United States (on September 22), spent \$1.1 million on Cartier jewelry in New York. According to the story, this information came from a former Cartier boutique

employee, who was allegedly fired the day after a conflict with Olena Zelenska. The employee supposedly revealed the details of the incident and posted photos of receipts for the mentioned sum on Instagram, claiming they were paid by Ukraine's First Lady.

SOURCE OF THE DISINFORMATION ATTACK. The disinformation was spread through the Nigerian publication "The Nation". The Instagram page, where the fake testimony from the "former Cartier boutique employee" was posted, was created a few days before the attack. The individual




in question turned out to be a student from St. Petersburg.

SPREADING CHANNELS. In September and October 2023, the fake story was most actively spread to the Ukrainian audience through websites and Telegram channels that mimicked both Russian and Ukrainian sources.

жерело	Аудиторія	Країна	Повідомлення
🚺 България Z 属 Bulgaria Z	3.89k	Bulgaria	4
news-kiev.ru	6.97k	Ukraine	2
"Deutsche Welle" py	36.9M	Germany	1
⊕ Украина.ру	3.2M	Russia	1
Vesti.bg	5.94M	Bulgaria	1
⊕ tsargrad.tv	49M	Russia	1
💶 Баба Яга против	26.2k	Russia	1
f Капустин Андрей	0	Ukraine	1
⊕ topnews.ru	3.42M	Russia	1
Харьковчаночка Za Правду	4.05k	Ukraine	1
"THE NAKED TRUTH"	1.07k	Bulgaria	1
spektrnews.in.ua	53.8k	Ukraine	1
∢ Отёб [о скрытом] Отё	4.77k	Russia	1
Я НЕ ХОЧУ В ТАМОЖЕННЫЙ СОЮЗ	2.4k	Ukraine	1
Bulgarian Military Union "Vasil Levski"	14.1k	Bulgaria	1



Of the 22 sources, 2 were identified as state-affiliated (Russian Federation), and 2 as disinformation disseminators. 8 of them, according to the Osavul platform, were previously involved in other information operations.



"THE ZELENSKY FAMILY BOUGHT GOEBBELS' VILLA"

CONTENT OF THE DISINFORMATION ATTACK. In December 2023, Russian propaganda spread a fake story claiming that the Zelensky family had purchased a vil-




la in Germany that once belonged to Joseph Goebbels. The real estate purchase was allegedly made through a company called Film Heritage Inc., which supposedly belongs to Olena Zelenska.

source of the disinformation attack. The disinformation originated from a statement by an alleged former employee of the consulting firm BIM, named Sabina Mels, published on her YouTube channel and Twitter account. This statement was widely distributed by several websites, including The Intel Drop, the Nigerian publication Independent, and other outlets..

SPREADING CHANNELS. In the Russian-speaking segment of the internet, from late December 2023 to the first days of January 2024, the fake story was most actively spread through Russian propaganda

Telegram channels, including those mimicking Ukrainian ones. Of the 22 sources, 8 were identified as state-affiliated (Russian Federation), and 18 as distributors of disinformation. According to data from the Osavul platform, 24 of these sources had previously been involved in other information operations.





«ZELENSKA PURCHASED A BUGATTI TOURBILLON FOR €4.5 MILLION»

CONTENT OF THE DISINFORMATION ATTACK. In July 2024, Russia propagated a false claim that Olena Zelenska allegedly bought a luxury Bugatti Tourbillon for €4.5 million in Paris. The exclusive car presentation supposedly took place during Pres-




ident Volodymyr Zelensky's official visit to Paris in June 2024, coinciding with the car's debut showcase.

SOURCE OF THE DISINFORMATION ATTACK. The false story originated on the fake website **Verite Cachee France**, which presents itself as a French online publication. The article cited a fabricated "employee of the Bugatti showroom," Jacques Bertin, who allegedly made a video statement (actually a deep fake)


on Instagram, including a falsified purchase receipt purportedly paid by Olena Zelenska.

SPREADING CHANNELS. Between June 30 and July 7, 2024, this disinformation was heavily spread to Russian and Ukrainian audiences through Telegram, social media platforms (X (Twitter), Facebook), and various websites from Russia or those mimicking Ukrainian sources. Among the 417 sources identified, 22 were classified as inauthentic, 35 as state-affiliated (Russia), and 57 as disinformation distributors. According to the Osavul platform, 70 of these had been involved in previous information operations.





Among the 417 sources identified, 22 were classified as inauthentic, 35 as state-affiliated (Russia), and 57 as disinformation distributors. According to the Osavul platform, 70 of these had been involved in previous information operations.




«THE ZELENSKY FAMILY BOUGHT STING'S VILLA FOR \$75 MILLION»


CONTENT OF THE DISINFORMATION ATTACK. In August 2024, Russian propaganda circulated a story claiming that the Zelensky family had purchased singer Sting's estate, Tenuta il Palagio, in Italy for €75 million. The alleged transaction

was reportedly completed through the company San Tommaso S.R.L., with Olena Zelenska as the ultimate beneficiary. According to the disinformation, the acquisition occurred on June 28, two weeks after President Zelensky's visit to the G7 summit in Italy.

SOURCE OF THE DISINFORMATION ATTACK. The story first appeared on August 5th on Database Italia, a website known for spreading disinformation and Russian propaganda in Italy. The site's editor, Luca La Bella, collaborates with Russian propaganda networks, including the "Foundation for the Fight against Repression," established by Yevgeny Prigozhin.




SPREADING CHANNELS. In the Russian-speaking internet segment, the false story was mainly disseminated via Telegram, Twitter, Facebook, and websites.




Among the 915 identified sources, 91 were deemed inauthentic, 62 were state-affiliated (Russia), and 103 were disinformation distributors. According to Osavul, 122 of these had participated in previous information operations.





Russian state media, such as RT, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Vechernyaya Moskva, and state-affiliated outlets like Komsomolskaya Pravda, were among the primary sources spreading the disinformation.





2. METANARRATIVE «UKRAINE COMMITS CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN»

«UKRAINIAN CHILDREN FOR FRENCH PEDOPHILES»

CONTENT OF THE DISINFORMATION ATTACK. In November 2023, Russian prop-

aganda spread a fabricated story accusing Olena Zelenska's Foundation of involvement in child trafficking. The story alleged that orphans from Ukraine were being sent to the West under the guise of «rescue from war» only to be delivered to "pedophile networks." The claim even named French philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy, known for his pro-Ukrainian stance, as one of the «pedophiles» purportedly receiving these children.




SOURCE OF THE DISINFORMATION ATTACK. The initial spread of this disinformation came from The Intel Drop, a site known for anti-Ukrainian propaganda masked



as «investigations.» The article featured testimony from an individual claiming to be a former driver for Zelenska's Foundation. In a video shared on the platform, this individual, whose face was obscured, spoke in French. The false story was simultaneously published in French by NetAfrique, a website typically focused on news from Burkina Faso, but which had previously spreaded disinformation about Olena Zelenska purchasing Cartier jewelry.


SPREADING CHANNELS. Between November 5 and November 30, 2023, the story was disseminated by 493 sources, including five identified as inauthentic, 73 state-affiliated (Russia), and 110 known disinformation spreaders.

According to the Osavul platform, 176 of these sources had previously engaged in other disinformation campaigns.




The disinformation was most widely disseminated on Telegram, X (Twitter), various websites, and the Russian social network VKontakte. Geographically, most sources were identified as Russian or originating from Russia and Ukraine (including temporarily occupied territories).






Among state-affiliated sources, leading Russian state media outlets such as RIA Novosti, TASS, Ukraina.ru, and the state-affiliated Moskovsky Komsomolets played prominent roles in amplifying the story.





«UKRAINIAN CHILDREN FOR BRITISH PEDOPHILES»

CONTENT OF THE DISINFORMATION ATTACK. In June 2024, Russian propaganda reignited a false story linking Olena Zelenska's Foundation to child trafficking. This




version claimed Ukrainian children were being transported to "European pedophiles," especially targeting "high-ranking pedophile communities in London." It alleged that this trafficking operation began in December 2022, following Olena Zelenska's official visit to the UK, with Hugh Grosvenor, the 7th Duke of Westminster, named as a supposed British "patron" of the child trafficking network.


SOURCE OF THE DISINFORMATION ATTACK. The story originated from a so-called **«investigation»** (in english) by the

Foundation for the Fight against Repression, established in March 2021 by Yevgeny Prigozhin. This **website** routinely publishes anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western disinformation disguised as "investigations." The article was simultaneously posted on **Rupor News**, under the authorship of Thomas Röper, a German-born blogger who has resided in Russia for 20 years and actively contributes to Russian propaganda efforts.

In June 2024, 187 sources circulated this disinformation story, including two identified as inauthentic, 14 state-affiliated, and 35 as disinformation distributors. According to Osavul, 37 of these sources had previously participated in other information operations.




The story spread most actively on X (Twitter), Telegram, and various websites. Most sources were identified as Russian or accounts that mimic Ukrainian sources.





Among state-affiliated sources were Russian state media, such as Ukraina.ru, and other propaganda outlets and Telegram channels.



«UKRAINIAN CHILDREN FOR AMERICAN PEDOPHILES»

CONTENT OF THE DISINFORMATION ATTACK. In August 2024, Russian propaganda circulated a false claim that Kamala Harris's associates, in collaboration with the Olena Zelenska Foundation, were involved in trafficking and sexually exploiting children transported from Ukraine to the United States. The disinformation alleges that this network serves the "American liberal elite" and is supposedly overseen by Tim Walz, the Democratic vice-presidential candidate. The narrative aligns with the U.S.-based QAnon conspiracy theory, attempting to exploit existing American conspiracy tropes.

source of the disinformation attack. The disinformation was framed as an «investigation» by the Foundation for Combating Repression, an organization linked to Russian media networks created by Yevgeny Prigozhin. The narrative cited «testimonies» from an unnamed «American investigative journalist» and an anonymous «trustee» of the Olena Zelenska Foundation. A German-language version of this disinformation was disseminated through Okvev.de, a website in the Russian propaganda network affiliated with Liana Kilinc, a known pro-Russian propagandist of German descent.








In the Russian-speaking information space, this narrative was mainly shared through Telegram and X (Twitter), though it did not gain substantial traction in comparison to other disinformation campaigns.





3. METANARRATIVE «UKRAINE IS STEALING INTERNATIONAL AID»

"VEHICLES FROM UAE"


CONTENT OF THE DISINFORMATION ATTACK.

In late January 2024, Russian propaganda circulated a fake story claiming that the Olena Zelenska Foundation deceived the UAE government by redirecting 50 ambulances intended for humanitarian purposes to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF). This was supposedly done on January 30, coinciding with an official announcement about the donation of these ambulances from the UAE government to Ukrainian medical workers.

SOURCE OF THE DISINFORMATION ATTACK. This narrative was initially spread through the Telegram

УКРОПСКИЙ ФРЕШ Фонд Елены Зеленской обманул правительство ОАЭ Украинские СМИ сообщают, что фонд первой леди Украинь Елены Зеленской и минздрав передали военным медикам 50 эвакуационных автомобилей скорой помощи. Однако есть нюанс эти автомобили поступили на Украину от правительства ОАЭ, которое передавало их исключительно для гражданских организаций Так, Маджед бин Камаль, директор по гуманитарной поддержке и помощи Управления международных отношений администрации президента ОАЭ, заявлял, что планируется и дальнейшая отправка гуманитарной помощи, необходимая **иирным жителям Украины** в зимний период Вот и получается "бинго": мало того, что Елена Зеленская от своего имени распоряжается международной помощью, так еще и передает ее на нужды ВСУ, хотя иностранные государства направляли ее на Украину совершенно на другие Screenshot from "Ukropsky Fresh" telegram-channel

channel Ukrop Fresh, part of a known Russian propaganda network. Between January 30 and February 7, 2024, the story was circulated by 24 sources, primarily Russian Telegram channels, including some posing as Ukrainian. Among these, 6 were identified as state-affiliated (Russia), and 10 as disinformation sources. 8 sources had previously participated in disinformation campaigns according to the platform Osavul.







"MISAPPROPRIATION OF POLISH FUNDS"




CONTENT OF THE DISINFORMATION ATTACK.


In December 2022, Russian propaganda promoted a false narrative claiming that the initial capital for the Olena Zelenska Foundation was sourced from funds «stolen» from Polish financial aid. The disinformation further alleged that this financial scandal caused tensions between Warsaw and Kyiv.

SOURCE OF THE DISINFORMATION ATTACK.

The fake news was made through the Russian telegram channel "Slovo naemnika", which has repeatedly (1, 2, 3) participated in information operations against Ukraine. In total, the fake news was disseminated by 8 sources, 2 of which were identified as state-affiliated (Russian Federation), and 2 as disinformation disseminators. 5 of them, according to the Osavul platform, were previously involved in other information operations.



The campaign was primarily conducted through Telegram, leveraging both Russian and Belarusian propaganda channels.





IV. CONCLUSIONS

An analysis of the primary Russian information operations aimed at discrediting Olena Zelenska from 2022 to 2024 reveals several conclusions.

- These operations largely follow the broader narratives of Russian propaganda. By spreading fake stories about corruption and crimes against children, the adversary seeks to provoke a strong negative emotional reaction in target audiences both within and outside Ukraine.
- The information attacks against Olena Zelenska follow a similar pattern. In most cases, disinformation is introduced into the information space through foreign publications (or ones that mimic foreign sources). This technique serves a dual purpose: to obscure the evident Russian origin of the claims and to create an appearance of neutrality. However, the primary threat is not posed by the initial sources (which are usually fringe), but by the spread of disinformation through Russian propaganda networks that ensure it reaches the target audience.
- To increase reach and draw additional attention, these fake stories often feature well-known personalities (celebrities, foreign politicians, etc.). It is clear that Russian intelligence services are aiming for a short-term impact on the portion of the audience that is unlikely to delve into the content of these fake messages, recognizing the baselessness of these fabricated accusations.
- The repetitive and patterned nature of these information operations suggests that Russian intelligence aims not so much to convince the audience of Olena Zelenska's wrongdoing but to create a persistent negative information backdrop around the First Lady of Ukraine.
- The findings of this study confirm previous conclusions from the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security about the threat posed by Telegram. In this case, Telegram serves as the main entry point for Russian propaganda into Ukraine's information space. The lack of systematic content moderation on this platform, combined with its high use by Russian intelligence services, enables disinformation to reach Ukrainian audiences. This is further facilitated by the absence of a language barrier.



V. RECOMMENDATIONS

- There is reason to believe that information operations against Olena Zelenska will continue. Over the 2022-2024 period, these campaigns have taken on a consistent narrative structure. Therefore, it is recommended to continue monitoring information threats to identify new propaganda narratives and develop countermeasures.
- Based on the nature of this information campaign, the most effective method of counteraction is the timely identification and prompt debunking of Russian propaganda fakes, along with detecting information operations.
- Given that most of these operations are aimed at both Ukrainian and foreign audiences, it is advisable to increase collaboration with foreign fact-checkers and institutions engaged in countering Russian disinformation.
- Additionally, it is recommended to place particular emphasis on highlighting the activities of the First Lady of Ukraine both in Ukrainian and international media, to build a positive image and counteract the negative information influence.



CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SECURITY